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Articles Tagged with Edward T. Kang

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Clipboard and Chart overlay on modern buildingPiercing the veil of limited liability companies (LLCs) allows a court to disregard the separate corporate personality of the company and its member(s) to reach the assets of the members and hold them liable for all or part of the LLC’s debts under Pennsylvania law.

In the September 3, 2020 edition of The Legal Intelligencer Edward T. Kang, managing member of KHF wrote “Piercing the Corporate Veil of LLCs Under Pennsylvania Law.

Piercing the veil of limited liability companies (LLCs) allows a court to disregard the separate corporate personality of the company and its member(s) to reach the assets of the members and hold them liable for all or part of the LLC’s debts under Pennsylvania law. Previously, I’ve written on the general substantive and procedural requirements of piercing the corporate veil of an entity and alter ego jurisdiction over corporate groups. This column addresses the Pennsylvania law on the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil as applied to LLCs.

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Illustration of computer monitor with six people video chattingPlease join KHF Managing Member Edward T. Kang (panelist) and Member Kandis L. Kovalsky (moderator) for an upcoming CLE, Next-Level ADR — The Future is Now for Arbitration in Complex Cases, during the NAMWOLF Virtual Annual Meeting, on September 16, 2020 from 4:00-5:00 PM ET.

The notable reasons for taking the arbitration route as opposed to heading to the Courthouse have only been exacerbated in recent months. We’ve seen what technology can (and can’t) do, what happens when the courthouse calendar gets further backlogged, and resources are slim. Where is arbitration heading in the legal profession?

Edward and Kandis will be joined by fellow panelists Nelson C. Bellido, Managing Partner of ROIG Lawyers in Miami, Florida; Marcus Wester, Senior Litigation Counsel, Harley-Davidson Motor Company; and Ingeuneal C. Gray, VP, Commercial Division, American Arbitration Association.

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Diverse group of business people with arms foldedA recent decision out of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan underscored the RICO “proximate cause” inquiry highlighting yet another, often overlooked, complexity in litigating such cases.

In the July 23, 2020 edition of The Legal Intelligencer Edward T. Kang, managing member of KHF wrote “Civil RICO and Proximate Cause: A Tool for Defendants and Challenge for Plaintiffs.

In March 2018, I authored a column on civil RICO claims brought under 18 U.S.C. Section 1962(a) and (b). In that space, I explained the complexity of those sections within RICO cases. A recent decision out of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan underscored the RICO “proximate cause” inquiry highlighting yet another, often overlooked, complexity in litigating such cases.

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Laptop with various paper coming out of itWhile it is likely that businesses will think to add force majeure clauses to future contracts, there is also reason to believe the specific language of these clauses could be modified. Likewise, there are other changes to be expected in post-pandemic contracts.

In the July 2, 2020 edition of The Legal Intelligencer Edward T. Kang, managing member of KHF wrote “The Future of Business Contracts Post-COVID-19.

Recently, I authored a column on force majeure clauses. In that space, I explained how many businesses have recently been turning to force majeure clauses in their contracts for protection in light of the COVID-19 pandemic. While it is likely that businesses will think to add force majeure clauses to future contracts, there is also reason to believe the specific language of these clauses could be modified. Likewise, there are other changes to be expected in post-pandemic contracts.

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Businessman in suit on green background.When nonresident members of a corporate group, usually the parent company, should expect to be subjected to the jurisdiction of Pennsylvania courts when one of the entities, usually the subsidiary, is based or does business in the state.

In the June 18, 2020 edition of The Legal Intelligencer Edward T. Kang, managing member of KHF wrote “Piercing the Corporate Veil of Corporate Groups to Establish Alter Ego Jurisdiction.

Last June, in this space, I authored a column about Pennsylvania law on substantive and procedural aspects of piercing the corporate veil of companies to reach the assets of their shareholders or the assets of a parent company in corporate groups. In early January 2020, I wrote a column about the development of Pennsylvania law on establishing personal jurisdiction over registered nonresident businesses since the Supreme Court’s decisions in. In this case, I address the intersection of those two related columns in cases involving corporate groups. That is, when nonresident members of a corporate group, usually the parent company, should expect to be subjected to the jurisdiction of Pennsylvania courts when one of the entities, usually the subsidiary, is based or does business in the state.

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Illustration of business paperwork by Megan RexazinMany businesses have now turned to the force majeure clauses present in their contracts—invoking the idea that the COVID-19 pandemic is an unforeseeable “act of God” that has hindered the ability of parties to perform their duties as agreed.

In the May 14, 2020 edition of The Legal Intelligencer Edward T. Kang, managing member of KHF wrote “Force Majeure During a Pandemic and Potential Contractual Disputes

In light of the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic, businesses and individuals alike have struggled with following through on contracts that were agreed upon long before the novel coronavirus was even discovered, let alone foreseen as the cause of a worldwide health crisis. Many have now turned to the force majeure clauses present in their contracts—invoking the idea that the COVID-19 pandemic is an unforeseeable “act of God” that has hindered the ability of parties to perform their duties as agreed. For those who do not have such clauses present in their contracts, can the same concept be invoked in a court of law?

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Back of head facing screenIn the March 19, 2020 edition of The Legal Intelligencer Edward T. Kang, managing member of KHF wrote “Time to Reconsider Remote Depositions in the Age of COVID-19

Remote depositions allow the deposition to proceed even though the witness is not in the same room as some or all of the other participating counsel and other persons entitled to be present.

As social distancing, travel limitations and working from home have become the norm due to the coronavirus (COVID-19), lawyers should give renewed consideration to conducting depositions by remote means. Remote depositions allow the deposition to proceed even though the witness is not in the same room as some or all of the other participating counsel and other persons entitled to be present.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 30(b)(4) and similar state rules authorize remote depositions by stipulation of the parties or court order. Having conducted several depositions through remote means recently, including expert depositions, our firm attorneys believe the benefits of taking remote depositions far outweigh the perceived limitations. Continue reading →

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Kang Haggerty & Fetbroyt Members Edward T. Kang, Jacklyn Fetbroyt and Kandis L. Kovalsky are attending the 2020 National Association of Minority and Women Owned Law Firms (“NAMWOLF”) Driving Diversity & Leadership Conference in Fort Lauderdale, Florida from February 22nd to February 25th. Continue reading →

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In the January 23, 2020 edition of The Legal Intelligencer Edward T. Kang, managing member of KHF wrote “Beyond the Courts: The Potential Future of Arbitration

This recent decision has implications for how practitioners understand the court system and arbitration system to usually work, as well as raising already-existent questions about the fairness of arbitration clauses and its applicability for various types of claims.

In a recent decision from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, we saw a rare event—the court affirmed the district court’s decision to vacate an arbitration award in Monongahela Valley Hospital v. United Steel, Paper and Forestry, Rubber, Manufacturing, Energy, Allied Industrial and Service Workers International Union, AFL-CIO, CLC, ___F.3d___ (3d Cir. Dec. 30, 2019). This case exemplified one of the rare situations in which the courts have decided to exercise authority and “correct” arbitration awards that have appeared to be blatantly unfair, which could arise from a variety of reasons. This recent decision has implications for how practitioners understand the court system and arbitration system to usually work, as well as raising already-existent questions about the fairness of arbitration clauses and its applicability for various types of claims.

Monongahela Valley Hospital involved a dispute between the hospital and one of its “bargaining unit” employees who are members of the union under a collective bargaining agreement (CBA). About half of the employees of the hospital are supervisors who are not bargaining unit employees. The CBA governed the relationship between the hospital and the bargaining unit employees. The grievances centered around the hospital’s denial of a unit bargaining employee’s request for vacation due to a non-unit bargaining employee’s request for the same time off. The hospital denied the unit bargaining employee’s request because her supervisor, a nonbargaining unit employee, had requested the same week off and both could not be away at the same time. Using its authority to have the “final” say in the matter, the hospital denied the bargaining unit employee’s request. Continue reading →

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In the January 2, 2020 edition of The Legal Intelligencer Edward T. Kang and Kandis L. Kovalsky co-authored “Five Years After ‘Daimler’: It’s All in the Specifics.

Major cases such as 2014’s Daimler AG v. Bauman have refined the requirements for, and in many senses restricted, the establishment of personal jurisdiction over parties. This goes for both the exercise of general and specific jurisdiction.

The exercise of personal jurisdiction is fundamentally connected with the constitutional right to due process. The question of whether it is fair and procedurally proper to subject a person to a forum state’s jurisdiction has been refined by the U.S. Supreme Court multiple times in the past decades, and especially in recent years. Major cases such as 2014’s Daimler AG v. Bauman have refined the requirements for, and in many senses restricted, the establishment of personal jurisdiction over parties. This goes for both the exercise of general and specific jurisdiction.

The basic notion behind general jurisdiction is that the defendant has to have, to quote directly from the well-known International Shoe v. State of Washington opinion, “continuous and systematic” affiliations with the forum state to reasonably expect that state’s jurisdiction over her, no matter the issue at stake (as opposed to specific jurisdiction, where the issue in question is the only reason one could expect to land up in another state’s court). But, what does “continuous and systematic” mean? Continue reading →

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