Articles Tagged with Pennsylvania

Kang Haggerty Associate Kandis Kovalsky was recently appointed to two Young Lawyer Division (YLD) leadership positions within the Pennsylvania Bar Association (PBA) and the Philadelphia Bar Association. She will serve as the liaison between the Federal Courts Committee and the YLD of the Philadelphia Bar, and as liaison between the YLD and State Civil Litigation sections of the PBA.
In her capacity as liaison to these committees, Kovalsky will attend governing counsels, participate in events, and interact with leadership of these committees within the statewide and city bar associations. She is expected to serve in an important two-way communications role in keeping young lawyers informed of important work in the Federal Courts and statewide civil litigation issues, and providing the committee with insight as to concerns of young attorneys in Philadelphia and Pennsylvania.

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ETK-2017-Head-Shot-200x300-1In the November 2, 2017 edition of The Legal Intelligencer, Edward T. Kang, managing member of the firm, writes on the liability attorneys face in regards to nonclients.

In Pennsylvania, traditionally, if lawyers or other professionals, such as accountants, performed their professional duties negligently, they could only be held liable to those with whom they were in direct contractual privity—in other words, their clients. Others who may have suffered damage because of that negligence—for example, a party to a transaction relying on the other party’s lawyer’s faulty opinion letter, or a bank relying on an opinion letter prepared by a borrower’s lawyer while extending credit to the borrower—would be without a claim in tort.

In much of the country, however, courts will extend the liability of professionals to cover nonclient third parties injured by the negligence of professionals in certain situations. This liability is typically found under a theory of negligent misrepresentation, adopted from Section 522 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. Section 522(1) provides: “One who, in the course of his business, profession or employment, or in any other transaction in which he has a pecuniary interest, supplies false information for the guidance of others in their business transactions, is subject to liability for pecuniary loss caused to them by their justifiable reliance upon the information, if he fails to exercise reasonable care or competence in obtaining or communicating the information.”

In an opinion handed down on August 22nd of this year, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that, unlike other contracts formed under Pennsylvania law, limited partnership agreements formed under the pre-Act 170 version of the Pennsylvania Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act, do not contain the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.

The Pennsylvania legislature amended the state’s Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act in late 2016 as a provision of Act 170, which altered the formation and operation of corporations, limited liability companies, limited partnerships, and other business forms.  As part of its revisions to the PRULPA, Act 170 provided that a limited partnership agreement could not change or do away with the contractual obligation of both limited and general partners to discharge their duties under the agreement in accordance with the contractual obligation of good faith and fair dealing.

The case, Hanaway v. The Parkesburg Group, LP, involved a dispute among members of a limited partnership (Parkesburg) that had been formed to invest in and develop several parcels of real estate. The plaintiffs, who were among Parkesburg’s limited partners, sued the corporation’s general partner, alleging that he sold Parkesburg’s assets to a new partnership he had formed, so that the new partnership could develop the real estate in question without the plaintiffs.

JF-head-shot-197x300Kang Haggerty member Jacklyn Fetbroyt has been selected for inclusion in the 2017 Super Lawyers’ Rising Star list for Pennsylvania in the practice areas of Business and Corporate law. This is the sixth time Jackie has received this accolade.

Published by Thomson Reuters, Super Lawyers is a ranking of outstanding lawyers from more than 70 practice areas who have attained a high degree of peer recognition and professional achievement. Rising Stars is a list of the top up-and-coming attorneys in a state – either 40 years old or younger, or who has been practicing for 10 years or less.

Published annually, the selection process uses a patented process of peer nominations, independent research and peer evaluations in determining the list. No more than 2.5% of the lawyers in the state are selected by the research team for the Super Lawyers’ Rising Star list. A description of the selection methodology can be found at http://www.superlawyers.com/about/selection_process.html.

Kang Haggerty founding member Jacklyn Fetbroyt has been selected for inclusion in the 2016 Super Lawyers’ Rising Stars list, published by Thomson Reuters.

For Jackie, this is her fifth time (2010, 2013-2016) as a Rising Star in the area of Business/Corporate law – Pennsylvania.

The Super Lawyers’ Rising Stars list recognizes up and coming attorneys in each state 40 years old or younger, or those who have been practicing for 10 years or less. No more than 2.5 percent of lawyers in each state are named to the Rising Stars list. The lists are selected and published by Thomson Reuters. The selection process includes a statewide survey of lawyers, independent evaluation of candidates by an attorney-led research staff, a peer review of candidates by practice, and a good-standing and disciplinary check.

The common interest doctrine (CID), also known as the community-of-interest doctrine, is an exception to the general rule that attorney-client privilege (ACP) is waived when privileged information is shared with a third party. The CID allows attorneys representing different clients with the same or substantially similar legal interests to agree to (and do) share privileged information without waiving the ACP.

For the CID to apply, (1) there must generally be co-parties (that is, co-plaintiffs or co-defendants—but the CID may also apply to communications between parties and nonparties, and sometimes in nonlitigation matters), (2) the co-parties must be represented by separate counsel (the CID is different from the co-client (or joint-client) privilege, which applies when multiple clients hire the same attorney to represent them on a matter of common interest), and (3) the co-parties must share a common legal interest, not merely a common commercial interest. Courts are divided on whether interests must be legally identical or somewhat less than that, such as substantially similar. And, of course, there must be an agreement among attorneys to share information.

If the above requirements are met, separate counsel for separate parties (or clients) may share information without waiving the ACP. In other words, the CID only protects communications between counsel, not between parties. Communications between parties are protected under the CID, however, if counsel is present during the communications. Continue reading ›

In Clipper Pipe & Serv., Inc. v. Ohio Casualty Insurance Co., the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the Contractor and Subcontractor Payment Act, 73 P.S. §§ 501-506 (“CASPA”), does not apply to construction projects where the owner is a government entity.

The United States Department of the Navy had entered into an agreement with Contracting Systems, Inc. II (“CSI”) for the construction of an addition to, and renovations of, a training center in Lehigh Valley. CSI, in turn, subcontracted with Clipper Pipe & Service, Inc. (“Clipper”) to perform heating, ventilation, and air conditioning work. When CSI failed to pay Clipper per the terms of their agreement, Clipper filed suit against CSI and its surety, the Ohio Casualty Insurance Company (“OCIC”) in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.

OCIC and CSI moved for summary judgment contending that CASPA does not apply to public works projects because a government entity does not qualify as an “owner” under CASPA. CASPA defines an “owner” as “[a] person who has an interest in real property that is improved and who ordered the improvement to be made.” “Person” is defined as “[a] corporation, partnership, business trust, other association, estate, trust foundation or a natural individual.” According to CSI and OCIC, government bodies cannot be “owners” under CASPA because the word “government” does not appear in the definition – i.e., a government body is not an “association” and therefore not a “person” or “owner.” Further, OCIC and CSI argued that the Prompt Payment Act (“PPA”), not CASPA, addresses public works projects. OCIC and CSI argued that given the substantial differences between CASPA and PPA, it would be untenable if both applied simultaneously.

The Superior Court of Pennsylvania found that the court erred in a bad faith claim in Mohney v. American General (2030 & 2046 WDA 2013). The Court reasoned that the insurer acted in bad faith by having no reasonable basis for terminating the plaintiff’s benefits.

Mohney purchased life insurance from U.S. Life (now succeeded and represented by American General) in October 1991 and September 1992. A year later, the plaintiff suffered an injury as a result of a traffic accident preventing him from returning to work. U.S. Life found Mohney to be totally disabled under the definition of their policy and disbursed insurance benefits on a monthly in basis. In February 1995 U.S. Life suddenly terminated Mohney’s benefits alleging that Mohney no longer met “the covered criteria for total disability as stated in [his] certificates” and was “able to perform regular duties of an occupation for which [he was] qualified”.

The plaintiff immediately initiated civil action against the defendant, and in June 1997 filed a complaint for fraud, breach of contract, violation of the Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law (“UTPCPL”), and insurance bad faith. During the following four years, U.S. Life’s objections were granted by the court. In 2001, U.S. Life filed a motion for summary judgement which was granted in part with the exception of Mohney’s breach of contract claim. The trial court found Mohney to be “totally disabled under the terms of the insurance contract” and awarded the plaintiff $20,772.58. Upon appeal the Superior Court affirmed the trial court’s breach of contract judgement, but remanded for a trail on the bad faith matter. In October 2013 the trial court ruled in favor of U.S. Life prompting Mohney to appeal the bad faith ruling which is the central consideration of the present memorandum.

The Superior Court of Pennsylvania recently affirmed the trial court’s opinion involving a bad faith action in Davis v. Fidelity National Title Insurance Company (674 MDA 2014). In the bad faith action law suit brought against Fidelity in the lower court, the plaintiffs were awarded over $2 million in damages.

The plaintiffs, Richard and Maria Davis, purchased a 15 acre-plot in Lackawanna County, Pennsylvania to develop a residential housing project. Three years later in 2007, a neighboring property owner, Louis Norella claimed that a part of that property, a 1.86 acre-plot, belonged to him. Fidelity, the title insurance company that had insured the Davises’ property, recognized later that year that there was a problem with the title and assured the Davises that the matter would be resolved. It wasn’t until 2012 that Fidelity finally purchased Norella’s property for $50,000. The plaintiffs claimed that this five-year delay on Fidelity’s part prevented the project from coming to fruition at the time, thus causing a lost profit damage.

In affirming the lower court’s opinion, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania stated that the “excessive delay” experienced by the Davises implicated Fidelity in bad faith action. The court also stated this excessive delay caused direct damage to the plaintiffs.

The extent of consumer protection of Pennsylvania’s Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law (UTPCPL) was brought to the attention of the Supreme Court in Christina Grimes v. Enterprise Leasing Company of Philadelphia, LLC, 4 MAP 2014. The Court finally decided legal fees alone do not satisfy “any ascertainable loss” as described by the UTPCPL.

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