On March 22, 2016, Kang Haggerty client Vizant Technologies received a $2.25 million judgment in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.
In the case, Vizant Technologies, LLC, et al. v. Julie P. Whitechurch, et al., Vizant asserted claims for breach of contract, defamation, and tortious interference with existing and prospective business relationships.
In Edward Kang’s March 2016 civil litigation column in The Legal Intelligencer and the Pennsylvania Law Weekly, he writes on the issue of M&As and Attorney-Client Privilege of Selling Corporations.
Courts have long recognized that the attorney-client privilege extends to corporations, as in Upjohn v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981). Because a corporation can act only through its agents, usually officers, a corporation’s attorney-client privilege generally applies to communications between the corporation’s authorized agents and counsel. As the U.S. Supreme Court explained in Upjohn, however, it is the corporation that holds the corporate attorney-client privilege, not individual officers.
“Thinking about making a lateral move to a small, boutique law firm? Recruiting successful laterals is critical to any firm’s success, regardless of size, and firms consider many factors in making a lateral hire. But for a small, boutique firm, a lateral hire will have an immediate impact. While big law firms can hire in large numbers and count on the laws of attrition to weed out the good from the bad hires, it is critical that small, boutique firms make the right calls—for the sake of both the law firm and the lateral,” writes Edward Kang in an article on lateral hiring as part of The Legal Intelligencer’s Top Laterals/New Partners supplement.
In the feature, Edward addresses some of the considerations to keep in mind when comparing a small, boutique law firm to a big firm; the importance of understanding the business of law; and the need for an appropriate business plan. Learn more about what Kang Haggerty looks for in a lateral and what a lateral should consider from a jump to a new law firm…READ MORE
The Legal Intelligencer
PA Law Weekly: Kang on CFAA and its impact on employer-employee litigation
January 30, 2016
Throughout 2016, Edward Kang will be a regular contributor to the Pennsylvania Law Weekly and The Legal Intelligencer on civil litigation issues impacting attorneys throughout the state. This month he writes on the topic of the CFAA and its impact on employer-employee litigation.
PA Law Weekly
In Clipper Pipe & Serv., Inc. v. Ohio Casualty Insurance Co., the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the Contractor and Subcontractor Payment Act, 73 P.S. §§ 501-506 (“CASPA”), does not apply to construction projects where the owner is a government entity.
The United States Department of the Navy had entered into an agreement with Contracting Systems, Inc. II (“CSI”) for the construction of an addition to, and renovations of, a training center in Lehigh Valley. CSI, in turn, subcontracted with Clipper Pipe & Service, Inc. (“Clipper”) to perform heating, ventilation, and air conditioning work. When CSI failed to pay Clipper per the terms of their agreement, Clipper filed suit against CSI and its surety, the Ohio Casualty Insurance Company (“OCIC”) in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.
OCIC and CSI moved for summary judgment contending that CASPA does not apply to public works projects because a government entity does not qualify as an “owner” under CASPA. CASPA defines an “owner” as “[a] person who has an interest in real property that is improved and who ordered the improvement to be made.” “Person” is defined as “[a] corporation, partnership, business trust, other association, estate, trust foundation or a natural individual.” According to CSI and OCIC, government bodies cannot be “owners” under CASPA because the word “government” does not appear in the definition – i.e., a government body is not an “association” and therefore not a “person” or “owner.” Further, OCIC and CSI argued that the Prompt Payment Act (“PPA”), not CASPA, addresses public works projects. OCIC and CSI argued that given the substantial differences between CASPA and PPA, it would be untenable if both applied simultaneously.
Philadelphia Business Journal
In Kellogg Brown & Root Services, Inc., et al. v. United States ex rel., __, 575 U.S. __ (2015), two questions were presented before the U.S. Supreme Court: first, whether the Wartime Suspension of Limitations Act (WSLA) suspends the already generous statute of limitation under the False Claims Act (FCA); second whether the FCA’s “first-to-file” rule, which states generally that if more than one whistleblowers file the actions on the same fraud, only the first to file survives and others are dismissed, bars later filed whistleblower actions if the first filed action has been dismissed.
Reversing the Fourth Circuit Court’s decision to extend the WSLA to civil offenses, the Supreme Court unanimously held in that the WSLA only applies to criminal offenses, meaning the WSLA does not suspend the statute of limitation for an individual action brought under the FCA. The Supreme Court further held that the False Claim’s Act’s first-to-file bar applies only while related claims are active. Once the first filed case is settled or dismissed, the bar does not apply.
In 2005, the whistleblower, Carter, filed a qui tam complaint alleging that his former employer fraudulently charged the U.S. government for water purification services inadequately or fraudulently performed during the Iraq War. Nearing trial, the complaint (Carter I) was dismissed under the first-to-file rule based on an earlier filing with similar claims in United States ex rel. Thorpe v. Halliburton Co., No. 05-cv-08924 (C.D. Cal., filed Dec. 23, 2005).
The Superior Court of Pennsylvania found that the court erred in a bad faith claim in Mohney v. American General (2030 & 2046 WDA 2013). The Court reasoned that the insurer acted in bad faith by having no reasonable basis for terminating the plaintiff’s benefits.
Mohney purchased life insurance from U.S. Life (now succeeded and represented by American General) in October 1991 and September 1992. A year later, the plaintiff suffered an injury as a result of a traffic accident preventing him from returning to work. U.S. Life found Mohney to be totally disabled under the definition of their policy and disbursed insurance benefits on a monthly in basis. In February 1995 U.S. Life suddenly terminated Mohney’s benefits alleging that Mohney no longer met “the covered criteria for total disability as stated in [his] certificates” and was “able to perform regular duties of an occupation for which [he was] qualified”.
The plaintiff immediately initiated civil action against the defendant, and in June 1997 filed a complaint for fraud, breach of contract, violation of the Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law (“UTPCPL”), and insurance bad faith. During the following four years, U.S. Life’s objections were granted by the court. In 2001, U.S. Life filed a motion for summary judgement which was granted in part with the exception of Mohney’s breach of contract claim. The trial court found Mohney to be “totally disabled under the terms of the insurance contract” and awarded the plaintiff $20,772.58. Upon appeal the Superior Court affirmed the trial court’s breach of contract judgement, but remanded for a trail on the bad faith matter. In October 2013 the trial court ruled in favor of U.S. Life prompting Mohney to appeal the bad faith ruling which is the central consideration of the present memorandum.
Kang Haggerty News