In the October 23, 2025 edition of The Legal Intelligencer, Edward T. Kang and Kandis L. Kovalsky co-authored, “The False Claims Act (FCA) can be a powerful tool to protect veteran health care in the wake of an uptick in private equity’s participation in the sector, in that it is now well-established that private equity companies and their principals can be held liable under the FCA.”

On Sept. 9, 2025, we had the great honor, along with our colleague Jacklyn DeMar, the chief executive officer of The Antifraud Coalition (TAF), of participating in a roundtable meeting at the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Veterans’ Affairs at the invitation of the Honorable Mark Takano, the Ranking Member of the Committee. The roundtable, titled “Profit Over Quality: Examining the Effects of Private Equity on Veteran Healthcare,” was specifically focused on private equity’s role in the demise of health care for veterans. We discussed with Reps. Mark Takano and Jullia Brownley how the False Claims Act (FCA) can be a powerful tool to protect veteran health care in the wake of an uptick in private equity’s participation in the sector, in that it is now well-established that private equity companies and their principals can be held liable under the FCA.

Under the FCA, a whistleblower, called a “relator,” can file an action for violations of the FCA in federal court on behalf of the U.S. government; this is known as a qui tam action. The FCA requires that the action must be filed under seal and remain sealed for 60 days, during which time the government can investigate the reported fraud and misconduct. The reality is that the seal period in qui tam actions is usually extended many times, and it is not uncommon for the investigations to take several years. Oftentimes, litigation follows the investigation, which can take another few years, and sometimes more. The recent monumental case of Penelow v. Janssen Products, out of the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey, which resulted in a $1.64 billion judgment, is a good example. This case was filed in 2012, yet a judgment was not obtained until 2025—13 years later.

We explained to Ranking Member Takano and other members of Congress that to disincentivize private equity companies from participating in fraud on the government, the investigations in qui tam actions must move much quicker than they do now. The speed of the investigation regarding any private equity defendant is critical. This is because, generally, private equity companies exit their portfolio companies within three to seven years, to align with the life cycle of their investment funds. Private equity firms do not typically have a large pot of money sitting in an operating account like other types of companies may. To be able to collect damages under the FCA against a private equity firm, there needs to be liquidity in the specific fund formed for the acquisition of the portfolio company at issue. In situations where qui tam actions, through investigation and litigation, are taking a case to a point where settlement or obtaining a judgment is occurring seven to 10 years after the private equity firm’s acquisition of the portfolio company, it can make it difficult to have any chance of collecting, unless individual liability can also be established. Even so, settlements based on individual liability will almost always be on an ability-to-pay basis (especially when the mandatory trebling of damages and statutory penalties are accounted for).

DeMar explained to Takano that one solution to this predicament is to increase resources and staffing to the civil departments within the Department of Justice that are responsible for investigating and prosecuting qui tam cases. Rep. Takano responded: “I am wondering if some of the members here, we might write a letter to DOJ about the staffing challenges. If we are looking for government efficiency and rooting out fraud, waste, and abuse, I think we have hit a pretty big vein here, and if we could redirect DOGE into things like this, I would hazard to guess what that amount of money would be.”

This is correct. Government fraud is rampant. According to the Government Accountability Office (GAO), the federal government loses between $233 billion and $521 billion annually to fraud, waste and improper payments. Since 2003, federal agencies have reported about $2.8 trillion in improper payments. In 2024, 16 agencies reported improper payment estimates that totaled $162 billion. Specific high-problem areas include government health care programs (Medicare, Medicaid, TRICARE) and government defense contracts. All these statistics directly correlate to taxpayers’ hard-earned money being effectively stolen. According to The Heritage Foundation, this pattern continues to contribute to a taxpayer burden that already exceeds more than $270,000 per household due to the $36 trillion in taxpayer debt.

In 2024, $2.9 billion was recovered under the FCA, 83% of which is attributable to qui tam suits. Since the enactment of Sen. Chuck Grassley’s 1986 reforms to the FCA, FCA actions have returned $78 billion to the taxpayers, with more than 70% of this amount being because of qui tam actions (and the remainder being from FCA actions filed directly by the government). These cases also have a strong deterrent on future fraud, estimated to be in the many billions.

While we were at the U.S. House of Representatives, discussing how to better use FCA to fight fraud, others sought to dismantle its very existence.

On Sept. 10, 2025, an article was published here in The Legal Intelligencer titled “Historical Patterns Cannot Justify Contemporary Violations of Constitutional Guarantees—Renewed Constitutional Attacks on FCA Qui Tam Provisions.” The authors of this article argued that “this is a pivotal moment for defendants to raise and preserve constitutional challenges to qui tam actions.” The article summarizes two court opinions from Judge Kathryn Kimball Mizelle, from the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Florida, and one concurrence from Judge Stuart Kyle Duncan, from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, in which these judges held that the FCA’s qui tam allowance violates Article II of the Constitution.

The FCA, also known as “Lincoln’s Law, was passed in 1863, during the Civil War. It was passed in response to war profiteers who defrauded the Union Army. The FCA has been good law for 162 years. So, why is there a push to change the law now? More importantly, why is this something defense lawyers would want and celebrate? If the FCA is ruled unconstitutional, the taxpayers will be saddled with billions more in debt each year while fraudsters profit from them, and the government will be left much more powerless to do anything about it. Further, holding the qui tam mechanism of the FCA statute as unconstitutional would not preserve or advance the interests of the Constitution; in fact, it would do the opposite and undermine many decades of precedent.

The constitutionality of the qui tam mechanism has been challenged many times before, and every circuit to consider the issue, including the Second, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits, has held, in decisions ranging from 1993 to 2002, that the qui tam provision is in accordance with the Constitutional separation of powers. This aspiration to dismantle the FCA began with a 2023 dissent by Justice Clarence Thomas, who has authored many FCA opinions since his tenure on the high court began in 1991 without raising this issue, including the infamous Escobar decision in 2016.

In 2023, in the case of Polansky v. Executive Health Resources, Thomas disagreed with the eight-Justice majority, which held that the government has broad discretion to seek dismissal of relators’ qui tam actions. Justice Thomas went further, though, in arguing that the qui tam function of the FCA violates Article II of the Constitution. In his flawed opinion, representation of the United States’ interests is an executive function conferred only to the president and individuals appointed as officers of the United States under Article 2, the appointments clause.

Shortly thereafter, Judge Mizelle, who clerked for Justice Thomas in 2018 and 2019, reached the same flawed conclusion in Zafirov v. Florida Medical Associates. The Eleventh Circuit’s decision in this case will be a defining moment for the FCA. If the court rules in favor of the appellants, it will be the seventh circuit to join the majority view that qui tam actions are constitutional. Suppose it rules in favor of the appellees. In that case, it will create a circuit split on the issue, and with not only Justice Thomas, but also Justices Brett Kavanaugh and Amy Coney Barrett itching to revisit this issue, it is somewhat unclear what the outcome would be.

Justice Thomas said last month that he does not view the high court’s prior rulings as “the gospel” and that any precedent that does not respect the U.S. Constitution or the country’s legal traditions is ripe for reconsideration. Justice Thomas’ attack on the constitutionality of qui tam actions seems to be a part of his larger philosophy to upend any precedent, no matter how longstanding, that he believes is violative of the Constitution. This approach undermines the public’s faith in the judiciary, which is already at an all-time low. In the case of the FCA, there appears to be no upside. More than 75% of the recoveries in FCA actions are from cases filed by whistleblowers. Simply put, the government does not have the resources to achieve what whistleblowers can in the FCA space. To dismantle qui tam actions would be bad for the public. And, for the reasons outlined in all the briefs filed on behalf of the appellants in the Zafirov appeal, particularly the amicus brief filed on behalf of Sen. Grassley, Justice Thomas, and Judges Mizelle and Duncan are wrong in their analysis.

For the sake of this country, let’s hope that the Eleventh Circuit does the right thing in the Zafirov appeal, that more resources can be allocated to the DOJ to fight fraud on the government, and that there can be a bipartisan approach in doing so under the FCA so that the government can recoup more of the billions of dollars that are siphoned off by fraudsters each year.

Edward T. Kang is the managing member of Kang Haggerty. He devotes the majority of his practice to business litigation and other litigation involving business entities. Contact him at ekang@kanghaggerty.com.

Kandis L. Kovalsky, a member with the firm, focuses her practice on a broad range of high stakes business-related civil litigation in Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and New York state and federal courts and arbitral tribunals, and representing relators in high stakes qui tam actions filed under the federal and state False Claims Acts.

Reprinted with permission from the October 23, 2025 edition of “The Legal Intelligencer” © 2025 ALM Global, LLC. All rights reserved. Further duplication without permission is prohibited. Request academic re-use from www.copyright.com. All other uses, submit a request to asset-and-logo-licensing@alm.com. For more information visit Asset & Logo Licensing.

Kandis Kovalsky is a member of Kang Haggery LLC and a YLD board member for TAF. Kandis has a particular passion for litigating false claims cases relating to the opioid crisis, including claims for illegal activity committed by drug companies, providers, and pharmacies.

Kang Haggerty members Edward Kang, Kandis Kovalsky and associates Ross Wolfe and Sofia Calabrese will participate in the largest annual gathering of whistleblower attorneys in the nation. Kovalsky and Calabrese are both members of the TAF Coalition’s Young Lawyers Division board.

On September 26^th, Kovalsky will present on “The End of Chevron Defense: How Does Loper Bright Impact Whistleblower Practice,” discussing how Loper Bright will impact the whistleblower space. She is also a panelist on a program about generating business as part of the TAF Young Lawyers Division Conference on September 24^th.

The firm is once again a proud event sponsor of the conference. The Anti-Fraud Coalition (TAF Coalition) is a public interest, non-profit organization dedicated to defending and empowering whistleblowers who expose fraud on the government and the financial markets.

In the August 30, 2024 Edition of The Legal Intelligencer, Edward Kang writes, “Going It Alone: Can Whistleblowers Seek Corporate Veil-Piercing in Declined Cases?“

Recently, I received an email from a national public interest organization dedicated to whistleblower advocacy. The message asked whether a relator (i.e., a whistleblower), while not a victim of fraud, has standing to seek corporate veil-piercing in a False Claims Act case where the government declined to intervene. It is an interesting question, and no one seems to know the answer. Having litigated complex veil-piercing cases and complex declined whistleblower cases, I wanted to dig a little deeper.

That answer requires some background. The False Claims Act (FCA), originally enacted in 1863, allows either the Attorney General or a private party to bring a civil lawsuit against anyone who knowingly submits a false claim to the government for payment. See 31 U.S.C. Section 3730(a), (b). In 2023, the government and whistleblowers initiated more than 1,200 new FCA cases, a record-high number, and the DOJ recovered approximately $2.7 billion through settlements and judgments. When an individual files a lawsuit on behalf of the government, it’s known as a qui tam action, and the private plaintiff is referred to as the relator.

When the relator files an FCA case, the suit is filed under seal for at least sixty days to allow the government to review the complaint and decide whether it will intervene. See Section 3730(b)(2), (4). If the government does choose to intervene, it takes the lead in prosecuting the case and is not bound by the relator’s actions. See Section 3730(c)(1). Even if the government does not intervene in the case, it still maintains a role and holds specific legal rights in the case, such as the right to intervene later for good cause (Section 3730(c)(3)) and to block a relator’s attempt to voluntarily dismiss the case (Section 3730(b)(1)).

The “corporate veil” refers to the legal separation between a corporation and its shareholders, which generally protects shareholders from liability for corporate debts. When the corporate entity is used as a sham to advance illegitimate purposes, however, courts may disregard the general rule and “pierce the corporate veil” to make the shareholders and their personal assets liable for corporate debts. Piercing the corporate veil is an equitable remedy and a theory of liability, and the standard of veil-piercing differs from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.

Now, back to the question of whether a relator has the standing to seek corporate veil piercing in False Claims Act cases where the government has declined to intervene. As an initial matter, the government’s refusal to intervene in an FCA action does not strip a relator of his Article III standing in bringing an FCA action when the relator does not suffer an injury in fact. Qui tam actions present a “well-established exception” to the traditional Article III analysis. See Spokeo v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 346 n.* (Thomas, J., concurring). In an FCA action, standing for an uninjured relator flows from an assignment theory. A qui tam relator is suing “as a partial assignee of the United States.” See Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 774 fn. 4 (2000). The qui tam action is for a redress of the government’s injury, and “it is the government’s injury that confers standing upon the private person.” See Stalley v. Methodist Healthcare, 517 F.3d 911, 917 (6th Cir. 2008). Thus, an uninjured relator has standing when “the FCA can reasonably be regarded as effecting a partial assignment of the government’s damages claim.”

The standard for piercing the corporate veil as a theory of FCA liability is governed by the federal common law. See Dekort v. Integrated Coast Guard Systems, 705 F. Supp. 2d 519 (N.D. Tex. 2010) (“Federal common law (rather than the law of the state where a corporation is incorporated), governs the veil-piercing question in a FCA case.”); see also United States v. Pisani, 646 F.2d 83 (3d Cir.1981) (“Federal law governs questions involving the rights of the United States arising under nationwide federal programs.”) (quoting United States v. Kimbell Foods. 440 U.S. 715 (1979)). The federal common law standard is generally articulated in broad terms and requires a fact-specific analysis of the circumstances in each given case to determine the propriety of veil-piercing. See Exter Shipping v. Kilakos, 310 F. Supp. 2d 1301 (N.D. Ga. 2004) (“Under federal common law, no uniform standard exists for determining when a corporation is the alter ego of its owners; each case must be decided based upon the totality of the circumstances.”) The essential legal test for veil-piercing in all jurisdictions is whether it would be “equitable to look behind the corporate form” under the circumstances presented. See United States v. Emor, 850 F. Supp. 2d 176 (D.D.C. 2012). In FCA cases, courts have held that courts can “pierce the corporate veil to prevent circumvention of a statute or avoidance of a clear legislative purpose.”

Courts have analyzed piercing the corporate veil as a theory of FCA liability in cases where the government declined to intervene. For example, in United States ex rel. Jenkins v. Sanford Capital, 2020 WL 5440551 (D.D.C. Sept. 10, 2020), the plaintiff tenant advanced an alter ego theory to hold the sole principal of the corporate landlord liable for FCA violations when the company deceptively took only superficial steps to remedy regulatory violations in the apartment building while continuing to take Section 8 voucher funds that depended on the building’s compliance with those regulations. The court analyzed and dismissed the veil-piercing liability theory, reasoning that the plaintiff’s allegations regarding the relationship between the principal and company were threadbare and conclusory. In another declined case, Scollick v. Narula, 215 F. Supp. 3d 26 (D.D.C. 2016), the court found that the relator failed to allege that defendant companies’ shareholders were individually liable under the FCA in connection with a purported fraudulent scheme to obtain set-aside government contracts, reasoning that the relator did not allege any fact showing that an inequitable result would follow if the corporate veil remained unpierced. Specifically, the court found that the relator failed to allege that corporations were undercapitalized or that he would be unable to recover damages from them if he succeeded in the action.

Some courts have found that relators sufficiently alleged FCA liability under a veil-piercing theory in declined cases. In Scharber v. Golden Gate National Senior Care, 35 F. Supp. 3d 944 (D. Minn. 2015), former nursing home employees brought a claim against the nursing home’s parent company under the veil-piercing theory for FCA violations arising out of the nursing home’s submission of fraudulent claims for Medicare and Medicaid reimbursement. Denying the defendant’s motion to dismiss the veil-piercing theory of liability, the court found that the relators made sufficient allegations against the parent company. Specifically, the court found that the relators had alleged a level of control by the parent company over the culture, policies, and decision-making at the nursing home sufficient for the parent company to be held liable under a veil-piercing theory. Similarly, in United States v. Kindred Healthcare, 469 F. Supp. 3d 431 (E.D. Pa. 2020), the court found the relator’s allegations of undercapitalization and siphoning of funds were sufficient to allege FCA violations under the alter ego theory between nursing home operators and their nursing facilities. Specifically, the court noted that failing to hold nursing home operators liable for facility conduct “would circumvent the statute by preventing full recovery” because the facilities were grossly undercapitalized and entirely dependent on the operators.

When the government declines to intervene in a relator’s case, it doesn’t necessarily mean that the case is weak or unwinnable. The whistleblower can still pursue the case independently. The decision not to intervene may simply reflect the government’s priorities or limited resources, rather than a judgment on the case’s merits. Whistleblowers and their attorneys can still proceed with the case, bring wrongdoing to light, and recover damages. Piercing the corporate veil provides yet another powerful tool for whistleblowers and their attorneys to fight fraud under the False Claims Act.

Edward T. Kang is the managing member of Kang Haggerty. He devotes the majority of his practice to business litigation and other litigation involving business entities. Contact him at ekang@kanghaggerty.com.

Reprinted with permission from the August 30, 2024 edition of “The Legal Intelligencer” © 2024 ALM Media Properties, LLC. All rights reserved. Further duplication without permission is prohibited, contact 877-257-3382 or reprints@alm.com.

In Show Me the Evidence: How Whistleblowers Can Obtain Information from the Federal Government Through Touhy Requests, Kovalsky breaks down what Touhy requests are, why they are useful, and what information to include in a request letter.

• What is a Touhy Request?
• Why are Touhy Requests Important?
• What Does a Touhy Request Look Like?
• Whistleblowing Healthcare Fraud? Don’t Forget About HIPAA!
• What Sort of Information Should be Included?

Learn more about Kang Haggerty’s qui tam practice at the Whistleblower Advocates.

The 2023 Public Procurement Symposium presents the opportunity to learn about emerging issues in the ever-evolving world of federal, state, and local procurement.

The article states that Danon and Vanguard have agreed to mediate the whistleblower-retaliation lawsuit he filed against Vanguard alleging a wrongful termination. A May 26 order by U.S. District Judge Berle M. Schiller requires the two sides to update him on June 16 on their efforts with an independent mediator and to keep updating him once a month.  The case will be stayed during the mediation.

The lawsuit, with court filings starting in 2013, says that Danon reported to his Vanguard supervisors that he had found two potentially billion-dollar tax frauds at the Malvern-based investment giant:

• Setting fees the company’s investor funds paid its own management company, so as to reduce its annual income tax obligations, which he said broke federal tax rules requiring a company to pay market prices for services from its own affiliates.
• Stashing cash in a $2 billion “contingency reserve” that was neither shared with investors nor subjected to income taxes.

Danon said he was fired by Vanguard in retaliation, less than a month after contacting the SEC for the alleged illegal practices by Vanguard.

Edward T. Kang of Kang Haggerty represents Danon. The Inquirer article states: If the court found Danon went to the SEC with allegations of “illegal practices” before he was fired, Danon “would have viable claims under the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform Act,” which includes hefty rewards for whistleblowers, according to Kang.

If you were the victim of whistleblower retaliation or want to learn more about whistleblower actions, please contact the Kang Haggerty attorneys at The Whistleblower Advocates today.

This grant of certiorari arises out of two Seventh Circuit cases in which the whistleblowers alleged that two companies who operate national pharmacies, Safeway and SuperValu, had defrauded the Federal Government for years by submitting false claims for reimbursement under Medicare and Medicaid. Proctor v. Safeway, 30 F.4th 455 (7th Cir. 2022); Schutte v. SuperValu, 9 F.4th 455 (7th Cir. 2021). The petitioners in both cases alleged that the two companies offered a significant discount in pricing to out-of-pocket Medicare and Medicaid patients at around $4.00 and then billed Medicare and Medicaid under a “usual and customary” price of around $108.00. Additionally, petitioners maintain that both companies knew about and supported efforts to conceal this practice. Albeit, recognizing the companies did overcharge Medicare and Medicaid, the Seventh Circuit used an “objective reasonable” standard articulated in Safeco Insurance Co. of America v. Burr, which states that an individual who acts under an incorrect legislative interpretation could not possibly have acted with knowledge or reckless disregard if their interpretation was “objectively reasonable” and there was no “authoritative guidance” explicitly cautioning against their interpretation. 551 U.S. 47 (2007). 

Medicare and Medicaid provide federal and state-funded health insurance to patients over 65 and low-income patients. Nonetheless, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid have promulgated regulations that limit reimbursement to the lower of two amounts; one of which, is the provider’s “usual and customary” charge to the general public. According to petitioners, the “usual and customary” lower charge offered to the general public was never the amount reported to the programs by the defendant pharmacies, who instead reported their much higher retail cash prices. Petitioners further alleged and presented evidence that both companies knew their lower discounted prices should qualify as the “usual and customary” price but tried to conceal this price. 

The Supreme Court states that the FCA defines the term “knowingly” as three states of mind: 1) “has actual knowledge of the information”, 2) “acts in deliberate ignorance of the truth or falsity of the information”, and 3) “acts in reckless disregard of the truth or falsity of the information”. Any of these three mental states suffice to constitute scienter under the FCA. Justice Thomas further quoted Halo Electronics, Inc v. Pulse Electronics, Inc., stating, “[C]ulpability is generally measured against the knowledge of the actor at the time of the challenged conduct.” 579 U.S. 93, 105 (2016). The Court quotes Halo to highlight that the “knowing” standard should be evaluated in the present tense of the action. The Court concludes that the respondent’s assertion that they could not have acted “knowingly” because they could not have “known” what the phrase “usual and customary” actually meant, is not plausible. The Court states that in and of itself, the term may be ambiguous; however, the ambiguity doesn’t preclude the respondent from having knowledge of what it means or, at a minimum, being aware they risk misinterpreting the term. Applying this to the facts, respondents were provided notice and tried to hide their discounted prices. This shows they comprehended the notice or were at least aware of the high risk of their misinterpretation. Thus, the Court held that facial ambiguity does not preclude a finding of scienter. 

The respondents relied on the holding in Safeco, which defines the common law definitions of “knowing” and “reckless” by contemplating whether the reading of the statute was “objectively unreasonable”. Respondents further asserted that because the FCA has the same common law terms, it should be read with the same objective common law focus. Justice Thomas writes that this assertion fails because Safeco interprets the Fair Credit Reporting Act differently than the FCA, which applies a different mens rea (state of mind) standard of willfully rather than knowingly. Further, Safeco stated that a person is reckless “if he acts knowing or having reason to know of facts which could lead a reasonable man to realize” that his actions were substantially risky. This interpretation does not support the respondents’ argument. The Court concluded that it would not look to a legal interpretation that nullifies the respondent’s belief at the time they submitted their claims. 

Justice Thomas described the final argument as an approach from a different angle in which respondents allege that under common law, misrepresentations of law are not actionable, and because the FCA incorporates the common law of fraud, the same limitation should be upheld. Respondents claim that because they correctly understood what “usual and customary” meant, their reports, in turn, were not false because of a misrepresentation of fact but rather one of law. The Court was unconvinced by this argument, stating that the respondent’s disclosure does not say “this is what our ‘usual and customary’ prices mean” but rather “this is what our ‘usual and customary’ prices are,” essentially misrepresenting fact under the guise of interpreting a legal meaning. 

The Court vacated and remanded the Seventh Circuit’s rulings for new judgments in both cases. So, what does this mean for the future of FCA claims? It means a lower bar for proving scienter in FCA cases. The Court unanimously confirmed that a lower threshold of scienter is required under the FCA. They confirmed that this new lower threshold should be one that is based on a subjective standard. Had they decided otherwise, a respondent could only be liable if there was no showing of an “objectively reasonable” explanation. This would have provided respondents in future cases the opportunity to justify their conduct after the fact, all the while discouraging otherwise valid relator claims of fraud. Now that the actions involving FCA scienter are evaluated in the present tense, more bad actors will experience the consequences of their fraudulent acts. 

Kandis L. Kovalsky, a member at the firm, focuses her practice on representing both corporate and individual clients in a broad range of complex commercial litigation matters in Pennsylvania and New Jersey state, federal and bankruptcy courts. Her whistleblower practice focuses on healthcare fraud. Kandis represents relators in high stakes qui tam actions filed under the federal and state False Claims Acts relating to fraud on government healthcare payors such as Medicare, Medicaid, Department of Defense TRICARE, State Children’s Health Insurance Program, Veterans Health Administration, and the Indian Health Service program. Contact her at kkovalsky@kanghaggerty.com. 

Looking to read more? Kang Haggerty members Edward T. Kang and Kandis L. Kovalsky recently analyzed this case in The Legal Intelligencer, When Is Knowing ‘Knowing’ in FCA Cases? High Court Examines Two Cases, published on May 19, 2023. 

Furman asked Kang Haggerty member Kandis L. Kovalsky for her perspective on pursuing claims declined by the U.S. government.Kovalsky explained “This case really shows […]\ that lawyers can make a difference through aggressively handling declined litigation.” Kovalsky also clarified that while the government is more likely to intervene in cases against pharmacies than those against private equity firms, she expects the government to increase its presence in cases against private equity firms in the future. Kovalsky described the potential lasting effect, saying, the settlement with Belhealth Investment Partners serves as a warning to private equity firms in healthcare not to place financial returns above patient well-being.

You can read the Press Release on the settlement here. If you have questions about the False Claims Act, contact the attorneys at Kang Haggerty for more information.

The program will provide varied perspectives from government, relator, and defense counsel on Touhy subpoena practice in declined False Claims Act cases. The conversation will cover the process and procedural elements of Touhy subpoenas, negotiations with the Government, and use of that information in litigation.

Joining Kandis on the panel will be moderator Zachary Arbitman, Feldman Shepherd; Paul Kaufman, United States Attorney’s Office for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania; and Amanda B. Robinson, Morgan Lewis.